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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Carlos Pagan-Lopez appeals from his judgment of conviction for two drug-related
offenses. These charges arose from a traffic stop and Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s subsequent arrest. At
the jail, law enforcement found methamphetamine in his sock. Based on this methamphetamine,
the State charged him with possession of a controlled substance and introduction of major
contraband into the jail. Mr. Pagan-Lopez moved to suppress the evidence because the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and their discovery of an arrest warrant did not
purge the taint of the initial illegality. The district court denied the motion. Mr. Pagan-Lopez
then tried to enter a guilty plea, pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, but the district court
refused it. The district court reasoned that Mr. Pagan-Lopez had a viable affirmative defense—
one which he knowingly and voluntarily desired to waive—and thus rejected his plea. At trial,
the district court excluded Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s proffered testimony about his mental health
condition. The jury found him guilty of both offenses. Later, the district court awarded the State
over $900 in restitution for its alleged cost to prosecute Mr. Pagan-Lopez.
On appeal, Mr. Pagan-Lopez raises five issues. First, he argues the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress. Second, he asserts the district court abused its discretion by
rejecting his guilty plea. Third, he contends his double jeopardy rights under the Idaho
Constitution were violated because possession of a controlled substance was a lesser included
offense of introduction of major contraband. Fourth, he submits the district court abused its
discretion by excluding his layperson testimony about his mental health condition. Fifth, he
asserts the district court abused its discretion by order him to pay restitution to the State for its
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prosecution costs. Based on these errors, this Court should vacate his judgment of conviction and
the district court’s restitution order and remand this case.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 2, 2016, Officer Feldner and another police officer conducted a traffic stop
of Mr. Pagan-Lopez and his fiancé. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.16–21, p.13, Ls.2–12.) The officers
learned Mr. Pagan-Lopez had an active felony arrest warrant. (Tr. Vol. I, p.13, Ls.12–15.)
Mr. Pagan-Lopez was arrested and taken to the Ada County Jail. (Tr. Vol. I, p.13, Ls.16–17.)
During his booking search at the jail, law enforcement found a small baggie with
methamphetamine tucked in his sock. (Tr. Vol. I, p.13, L.19–p.14, L.1.)
Based on this methamphetamine, the State alleged Mr. Pagan-Lopez committed two
offenses:  possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), in violation of I.C. § 37-
2732(c), and introduction of major contraband (methamphetamine) into a correctional facility, in
violation of I.C. § 18-2510(3). (R., pp.8–9.) The magistrate held a preliminary hearing and bound
Mr. Pagan-Lopez over to district court. (R., pp.22–25; see generally Prelim. Hr’g Tr.1) The State
charged Mr. Pagan-Lopez with both offenses. (R., pp.31–32.) Mr. Pagan-Lopez entered a plea of
not guilty. (R., p.35.)
Mr. Pagan-Lopez moved to suppress all evidence following the traffic stop and
subsequent search at the jail. (R., pp.49, 50–53.) He argued the officers did not have reasonable
suspicion  to  stop  him  and  the  officer’s  discovery  of  an  arrest  warrant  was  not  sufficiently
attenuated from the unlawful stop. (R., pp.50–53.) The State did not file a response. The district
1 This transcript, admitted at the suppression motion hearing, will be cited separately as “Prelim.
Hr’g Tr.”
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court held a hearing on the motion. (See generally Tr. Vol. I,2 p.1, L.7–p.19, L.4.) At the hearing,
the parties stipulated to the admission of the preliminary hearing transcript and two exhibits: a
Google Earth overview of the residential area in question and an incident report. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1,
L.23–p.2, L.3, p.2, L.14–p.3, L.15; see also Prelim. Hr’g Tr.; State’s Exs.1–2.3) The parties also
stipulated to the fact  that  law enforcement was responding to a silent residential  alarm at 2294
South Longmont Drive. (Tr. Vol. I, p.2, L.22–p.3, L.3, p.3, L.12–p.4, L.4.)
After further argument by the parties, the district court orally denied the motion. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.12, L.12–p.18, L.23.) The district court found the following facts:
On December 2 of 2016, at, approximately, 5:02 o’clock a.m. Officers
Feldner and Sontag were dispatched to a silent residential alarm on a laundry
room door at 2294 South Longmont Drive, which sits at the very end of a dead-
end street as depicted in Exhibit 1.
Officers observed that the house was on a short dead-end street and saw a
white  van  at  the  stop  sign  preparing  to  exit  the  street.  It  was  the  only  operating
vehicle on the street. Officers observed that there wasn’t much traffic at all, and
hadn’t seen very many other vehicles. The officers decided to perform a stop on
the vehicle for suspicion of burglary. That stop occurred—it appears—between
5:11 o’clock and 5:14 o’clock a.m.
After  stopping  the  car,  officers  observed  there  was  a  driver  and  a
passenger in the vehicle. Officers began the identification of the driver at 5:14
o’clock by driver’s license. Officers began the identification of the passenger at
5:15 o’clock a.m. by the driver’s license. Officers identified the passenger as
defendant Carlos Pagan-Lopez. Officers ran the occupants of the vehicle for
wants and warrants and discovered at 5:21 o’clock that the defendant had an
active felony warrant for his arrest.
It was at that time that Officer Feldner placed defendant under arrest and
Officer Ellis transported him to the jail. At the jail, Officer Keber participated in
booking the defendant. When Officer Keber searched the defendant, he
2 There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the motion to
suppress hearing, entry of plea hearing, and trial. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the
sentencing hearing.
3 The suppression motion exhibits and trial exhibits both have exhibits labeled State’s Exhibits 1
and  2.  For  ease  of  reference,  the  trial  exhibits  will  be  cited  as  “State’s  Tr.  Ex.”  with  the
corresponding number.
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discovered a small Ziploc Baggie that appeared to contain methamphetamine. At
the intake room of the Ada County Jail, the baggie was on the defendant’s left leg
slightly above where his sock line was. The defendant removed it from that
location and handed it to Officer Keber. That small Ziploc Baggie contained
methamphetamine.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.12, L.16–p.14, L.1.) After finding these facts, the district court ruled that the
officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop for their silent alarm investigation.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.16, L.13–p.18, L.6.) The district court also determined the detention was not any
longer than necessary because, shortly after the stop, the officers learned of the active felony
arrest warrant. (Tr. Vol. I, p.18, Ls.7–14.) Therefore, the district court held that the evidence
gained as a result of the stop (the methamphetamine) was admissible and denied the motion.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.18, Ls.7–9, 15–23.)
Three days later, Mr. Pagan-Lopez informed the district court that he desired to enter a
guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. (Tr. Vol. I, p.24, L.6–p.25, L.2.) In
exchange for Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, the State
agreed to dismiss the other charge of introduction of major contraband. (Tr. Vol. I, p.27, Ls.6–
11.) The State agreed to recommend probation, with an underlying sentence of five years, with
two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.27, Ls.11–16.) Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s guilty plea would not be
conditional, meaning that he would not reserve the right to appeal the district court’s denial of
his suppression motion. (Tr. Vol. I, p.26, L.24–p.27, L.4.) During the plea colloquy, Mr. Pagan-
Lopez  admitted  to  possession  of  a  controlled  substance,  but  also  explained  that  he  initially
picked  up  the  substance  intending  to  throw  it  away.  (Tr.  Vol.  I,  p.34,  Ls.4–24.)  He  said  there
were children around the area where he found it. (Tr. Vol. I, p.35, Ls.4–9.) He further explained
that he put the substance in his sock and forgot about it. (Tr. Vol. I, p.34, L.25–p.35, L.9.) Due to
these statements, the district court refused to accept Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s guilty plea because the
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district  court  believed  he  had  a  potential  affirmative  defense  of  necessity,  which  somehow
invalidated his admission to committing the crime. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.35, L.10–p.37, L.22.)
Consequently, Mr. Pagan-Lopez proceeded to trial.
At  trial,  the  State  called  four  witnesses.  First,  Officer  Feldner  testified  that  he  arrested
Mr. Pagan-Lopez per dispatch’s instruction after a traffic stop. (Tr. Vol. I, p.142, L.6–p.145,
L.15.) This occurred early in the morning on December 2, 2016. (Tr. Vol. I, p.139, L.24–p.140,
L.14.) During a search incident to arrest, Officer Feldner testified that he found a hypodermic
needle in Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s pocket. (Tr. Vol. I, p.151, Ls.4–11.) Officer Feldner did not
preserve the needle as evidence or cite Mr. Pagan-Lopez for possession of the needle. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.151, L.25–p.152, L.25.) Officer Feldner explained that a different officer, Officer Ellis,
transported Mr. Pagan-Lopez to the Ada County Jail. (Tr. Vol. I, p.146, Ls.21–25.) Next, Deputy
Keber with the Ada County Jail testified that he searched Mr. Pagan-Lopez at the jail and found
a small baggie with a crystal-like substance inside Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s sock “almost like it was
maybe stuck to his leg.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.160, L.22–p.162, L.12.) Then, Deputy Ellis testified that
he transported Mr. Pagan-Lopez to the jail and was present during Deputy Keber’s search and
discovery of the baggie. (Tr. Vol. I, p.174, Ls.15–18, p.175, L.5–p.177, L.24; see also State’s
Tr.  Ex.  1  (baggie  photograph).)  Finally,  Corinna  Owsley  with  the  Idaho  State  Police  Forensic
Services testified that the crystal substance in the baggie tested positive for methamphetamine.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.190, L.19–p.191, L.15.) The State rested. (Tr. Vol. I, p.194, L.16.)
After the State rested, Mr. Pagan-Lopez informed the district court that he desired to
testify in his defense. (Tr. Vol. I, p.195, L.6–p.198, L.15.) His trial counsel told the district court
and the State that he intended to ask Mr. Pagan-Lopez about his memory problems and epilepsy.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.198, Ls.20–23.) Mr. Pagan-Lopez suffered from short-term memory loss. (Tr. Vol.
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I, p.201, Ls.8–10.) Trial counsel explained that this evidence was relevant as to why
Mr. Pagan-Lopez failed to inform law enforcement about the baggie of methamphetamine in his
sock. (Tr. Vol. I, p.199, Ls.6–14.) Trial counsel clarified that he did not intend to have
Mr. Pagan-Lopez testify that he was not “capable of knowingly possession anything given his
mental condition.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.201, Ls.5–8.) The State objected. (Tr. Vol. I, p.198, L.24–p.199,
L.4, p.199, Ls.16–22.) The district court ruled that evidence was inadmissible because
Mr. Pagan-Lopez failed to give the State notice. (Tr. Vol. I, p.199, L.23–p.201, L.4, p.201,
Ls.14–20.)
Mr. Pagan-Lopez testified that, on December 1, 2016, he had gone to the Corpus Christi
House with his fiancé to take a shower, get clothing, and check his mail. (Tr. Vol. I, p.205, L.6–
p.207, L.9.) There are separate showers for men and women, but the showers are open and
available to children. (Tr. Vol. I, p.207, Ls.10–16, p.208, Ls.20–23.) After he took a shower,
Mr.  Pagan-Lopez  said  he  saw the  baggie  under  a  bench  as  he  was  getting  dressed.  (Tr.  Vol.  I,
p.208, Ls.2–10.) He grabbed the baggie to give it to the Corpus Christi House director, but he
forgot after his fiancé told him he had to go to a meeting. (Tr. Vol. I, p.208, Ls.10–17.) He
testified that he put the baggie in his sock. (Tr. Vol. I, p.209, Ls.3–4.) Mr. Pagan-Lopez and his
fiancé then left the Corpus Christi House, visited friends, did laundry, and went to a church
dinner. (Tr. Vol. I, p.211, Ls.5–12.) He testified that he had forgotten about the baggie once he
left the Corpus Christi House. (Tr. Vol. I, p.209, Ls.13–15.) By the early morning of December
2, Mr. Pagan-Lopez and his fiancé were driving around collecting aluminum cans to sell for gas
money. (Tr. Vol. I, p.209, Ls.16–23.) He testified that he found a used syringe (which he also
intended to dispose of) while looking for cans. (Tr. Vol. I, p.210, Ls.5–19.) After that,
Mr. Pagan-Lopez and his fiancé continued to collect cans until the traffic stop by Office Feldner.
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(Tr. Vol. I, p.211, Ls.1–6.) He explained that Officer Feldner searched him, found the syringe,
and had him transported to the jail. (Tr. Vol. I, p.211, L.14–p.212, L.1.) At the jail, Mr. Pagan-
Lopez testified that he was searched and the baggie in his sock was found. (Tr. Vol. I, p.212,
Ls.6–18.) Mr. Pagan-Lopez testified that he did not remember the baggie until then. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.211, Ls.7–10, p.212, Ls.2–3, 12–14.) After Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s testimony, the defense rested.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.218, Ls.1–5.)
On rebuttal, the State recalled Officer Feldner. (Tr. Vol. I, p.231, Ls.1–16.) Officer
Feldner testified that the syringe had a cap and looked new. (Tr. Vol. I, p.233, Ls.2–20; see also
State’s Exs.3–4.) On cross-examination, Officer Feldner admitted that he characterized the
syringe as used in his report, but then explained on redirect that that could be attributable to the
absence of packaging and “just coming off of someone’s person.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.240, Ls.8–10,
p.241, Ls.9–10.)
Both parties rested. (Tr. Vol. I, p.241, L.23–p.242, L.4.) In closing, the State argued
Mr. Pagan-Lopez was guilty of both possession of a controlled substance and introduction of
major contraband due to the baggie of methamphetamine found in his sock during the jail search.
(See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.254, L.6–p.262, L.1.)
The jury found Mr. Pagan-Lopez guilty of both charges. (Tr. Vol. I, p.277, Ls.6–25;
R., p.105.)
At the start of the sentencing hearing, the district court noted the State’s request for
$1,152.25 in restitution, including $996.27 in drug prosecution costs. (Tr. Vol. I, p.4, Ls.4–17.)
The State’s request consisted of a sworn “Certificate of Records” from an employee of the Ada
County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, who had access to payroll records. (R., pp.116–17.) The
Certificate of Records identified the time spent by various attorneys on the case, but did not
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identify the specific tasks, dates, or hourly rates. (R., pp.116–17.) Mr. Pagan-Lopez objected to
the State’s request for its prosecution costs. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.22–p.5, L.11.) He argued, among
other  things,  the  breakdown  of  attorney’s  time  spent  on  the  case  was  not  sufficient  to  award
restitution. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.7–11.) The parties then made their sentencing recommendations.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.19–p.13, L.5.) The district court sentenced Mr. Pagan-Lopez to five years,
with one year fixed, for possession of a controlled substance, and two and one-half years, with
zero fixed years, for introduction of major contraband, to be served concurrently. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.14, Ls.3–10; R., pp.109–12.) The district court also retained jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. II, p.15,
Ls.1–17; R., p.110.) As for restitution, the district court ordered the full amount requested by the
State. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.21–22; R., pp.114–15.) The district court did not provide any
reasoning on the record regarding its restitution award. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.21–22.)




I. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s motion to suppress?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by rejecting Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s guilty plea?
III. Did  Mr.  Pagan-Lopez’s  convictions  and  punishments  for  possession  of  a  controlled
substance and introduction of contraband into the jail violate his right to be free from
double jeopardy?
IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion at trial by excluding Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s
layperson testimony of his mental health?
V. Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Pagan-Lopez to pay restitution




The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s Motion To Suppress
A. Introduction
Mr. Pagan-Lopez asserts the district court should have granted his motion to suppress
because the warrantless traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. This traffic stop was
unlawful because the police officers did not have reasonable suspicion for the seizure. Moreover,
the officers’ discovery of an arrest warrant for Mr. Pagan-Lopez did not break the causal chain
between  the  unlawful  stop  and  the  discovery  of  evidence  on  his  person  at  the  jail.  Since  the
discovery of the arrest warrant was not a sufficient intervening circumstance, the exclusionary
rule required suppression of the evidence obtained after the unlawful seizure.
B. Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to
suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). The Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they
are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013).
The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the
facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de
novo. State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111 (2013) (citing State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 127
(2010)).
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C. The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s Motion Because The Police
Officers Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion For The Traffic Stop And The Discovery
Of Evidence Was Not Adequately Attenuated From The Unlawful Stop
“The  Fourth  Amendment  of  the  United  States  Constitution  protects  citizens  from
unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in
original). A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable, unless the State shows that the
seizure fits within a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. Green, 158 Idaho at
886–87; see also Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002) (“When a warrantless search or
seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.”); State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570
(Ct. App. 2014) (same). In this case, Mr. Pagan-Lopez first asserts the State failed to meet its
burden to justify his warrantless seizure. Second, he argues the discovery of the arrest warrant
was not an intervening circumstance that sufficiently purged the taint of his unlawful seizure.
1. There Was No Reasonable Suspicion To Justify The Traffic Stop
“Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at
112 (quoting State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007)). “Limited investigatory detentions are
permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” Id. “[T]ypically, seizures must be based on probable
cause to be reasonable. However, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable
cause, are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a
person  has  committed,  or  is  about  to  commit,  a  crime.” State  v.  Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 710
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(Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 499–500
(1983) (plurality opinion)).
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (quoting State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). “[A]n officer may take into account his experience and law
enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered,” Danney, 153 Idaho at 410, but
“[t]he  officer,  of  course,  must  be  able  to  articulate  something  more  than  an  ‘inchoate  and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (same). “The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at
112.
In this case, the facts known to the officers did not give rise to reasonable suspicion for
Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s seizure. “The Supreme Court has previously held that otherwise innocent
acts, when considered together, can be sufficiently suspicious so as to justify an investigative
detention.” State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761, 764 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9–
10). Here, however, the innocent facts are not sufficiently suspicious. The officers knew that a
silent residential alarm went off in the laundry room door of a house at approximately 5:00 a.m.
(See State’s Ex. 2, p.2.) The officers were responding to that alarm, but had no knowledge of its
cause, be it a household member, an animal, a fallen item, an alarm malfunction, or an unwanted
intruder. While driving east on Iowa Street towards Longmont Street (the residence’s street), the
officers saw a vehicle at the stop sign on Longmont Street. (See Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.16, Ls.9–21;
State’s Ex. 1.) They immediately stopped the vehicle, without even going down Longmont Street
or checking on the residence. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.16, Ls.22–24.) Officer Feldner testified that he
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believed the vehicle was involved in a potential, but wholly unverified, burglary of the residence
because it “was present on that dead end street at the time of day, being the only vehicle there.”
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.17, Ls.13–16; see also Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.17, Ls.3–12.) He acknowledged
that there were no other facts connecting the vehicle to his investigation. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.17,
Ls.17–19.) Officer Feldner’s testimony, coupled with the facts known to the officers at the time
of the stop, show that the officers were acting on nothing more than a hunch that this vehicle was
involved in the silent residential alarm. Thus, the totality of the circumstances did not establish
reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop.
Further, the facts here are distinguishable from other alarm response or burglary report
cases. In the other cases, the officers possessed some additional fact regarding the alarm or
report, the premises, or the suspect to create reasonable suspicion. For example, in State v.
Robertson, an officer responded to an “audible security alarm” for a local business, which had
been burglarized and vandalized in the recent past. 134 Idaho 180, 183, 185 (Ct. App. 2000). It
was night. Id. at 183. The officer saw a single individual walking away from the business about
100 to 125 feet away. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to
detain the individual. Id. at 185. Similarly, in State v. Rawlings, multiple officers responded to a
report of a burglary for a business on Fairview Avenue in Boise, Idaho, between 4:30 and 5:00
a.m. 121 Idaho 930, 931, 932 (Ct. App. 1991). The building had visible signs of forced entry,
and the police “believed that the perpetrator could still be on the premises.” Id. at 932–33. One
officer at the scene saw an individual about 150 feet away in the business’s parking lot. Id. at
931. The individual was walking away from the business, out of the officer’s view, and towards
a motel. Id. at 933. The Court of Appeals held that the facts, taken together, provided reasonable
suspicion to detain the individual. Id. at 933. Likewise, in State v. Kessler, multiple officers
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responded to a report of two or three people breaking a vehicle’s window in an apartment
complex around 1:30 am. 151 Idaho 653, 654 (Ct. App. 2011). One officer saw three men in dark
clothing  running  away  from  the  crime  scene,  and  the  men  did  not  stop  upon  the  officer’s
command. Id. The officer was able to apprehend one of them. Id. Another officer went to an area
six to eight blocks away in the direction the men were running and saw a man in dark clothing
walking briskly towards the officer. Id. at 654, 657. When the man saw the officer, the man
stopped and looked away, “causing the officer to believe that he might be planning to run.” Id. at
654. The Court of Appeals held that it was objectively reasonable to detain the individual to
investigate the reported crime. Id. at 657.
In contrast to Robertson, Rawlings, and Kessler, the officers in this case lacked any
objectively reasonable facts to elevate their inchoate hunch to reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. The alarm here was a silent alarm for a residence, not an audible security alarm for a
closed business or a report of a burglary. A business security alarm or burglary report weighs in
favor of criminal activity, but there are many innocent reasons why a residential alarm would go
off in the early morning. And, unlike the other cases, the officers here had not even arrived at the
scene or determined the cause of the alarm before detaining Mr. Pagan-Lopez. In addition, there
was no evidence that the residence had been burglarized or vandalized in the past. Also, unlike
Rawlings and Kessler, Mr. Pagan-Lopez was not speeding away from the residence, beginning to
speed away upon the officers’ arrival, or even showing any signs of nervousness, surprise,
furtive movement before the seizure. In short, there was no evidence of flight or evasion. Finally,
Mr. Pagan-Lopez was at the end of the street at the intersection, not 100 to 150 feet away from
the “crime scene” like the individuals in Robertson or Rawlings. Mr. Pagan-Lopez could have
come from at least eight other houses, had turned around in the dead-end street, or briefly pulled
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over for a variety of reasons. This comparison to the facts in Robertson, Rawlings, and Kessler
demonstrates the absence of any objectively reasonable facts to support a particularized
suspicion that the vehicle and its occupants were involved in criminal activity related to the silent
residential alarm. The district court therefore erred by holding the traffic stop was lawful.
2. The Discovery Of The Arrest Warrant Did Not Purge The Taint Of The Unlawful
Stop And Therefore The Evidence Should Be Suppressed
Due to the unlawful traffic stop, Mr. Pagan-Lopez asserts the evidence found during law
enforcement’s search at the jail must be suppressed. “The exclusionary rule requires the
suppression of both ‘primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure’
and, pertinent here, ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality,’ the
proverbial ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720 (2017) (quoting
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)). Here, the district court did not consider or
apply the exclusionary rule because it held that the stop was lawful. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.12, L.12–
p.18, L.23 (district court’s oral ruling).) The parties, however, presented argument on the
exclusionary rule and, in particular, one of its exceptions:  the attenuation doctrine. (See Tr. Vol.
I, p.4, L.10–p.10, L.2, p.10, L.4–p.12, L.11; R., pp.51–52.) Now on appeal, Mr. Pagan-Lopez
submits this Court has the necessary factual findings to rule on the attenuation doctrine.
Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court remand this case for the district court to make
the requisite findings and apply this doctrine.
a. The discovery of an arrest warrant did not break the causal chain between
the unlawful traffic stop and the discovery of evidence
The attenuation doctrine “allows evidence to be admitted ‘when the connection between
unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some
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intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has
been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” Cohagan, 162
Idaho at 721 (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016)). “There are three factors for
a court to consider when determining whether unlawful conduct has been adequately attenuated.”
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004). “Those factors are:  ‘(1) the elapsed time between the
misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances,
and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.’” Cohagan, 162
Idaho at 722 (quoting Page, 140 Idaho at 846). “The state bears the burden of showing the
attenuation such that the statements were sufficiently an act of free will purging the primary
taint.” State v. Fenton, No. 44546, 2017 Opinion No. 48, p.4 (Ct. App. 2017), petition for review
pending.
The first factor, elapsed time, weighs in favor of suppression. The relevant time period is
the time between misconduct (the unlawful traffic stop) and the acquisition of the evidence (the
search of Mr. Pagan-Lopez at the jail). See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062; Cohagan, 162 Idaho at
722. “This factor favors attenuation unless ‘substantial time’ elapses between an unlawful act
and when the evidence is obtained.” Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (citing Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S.
626, 633 (2003) (per curiam)). A “short time interval,” such as a few minutes or a couple of
hours, favors suppression. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604
(1975) (elapsed time of “less than two hours” favored suppression)). Here, the district court
found the traffic stop occurred between 5:11 and 5:14 a.m. (Tr. Vol. I, p.13, Ls.3–5.) The
incident report states Mr. Pagan-Lopez arrived at the jail at 6:00 a.m. (State’s Ex. 2.) The search
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occurred in the intake room, presumably shortly after Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s arrival at the jail.4
(Prelim.  Hr’g  Tr.,  p.5,  L.5.)  Therefore,  a  substantial  time did  not  elapse  between the  unlawful
traffic  stop  and  the  discovery  of  evidence  at  the  jail.  The  short  period  of  time  warrants
suppression.
The second factor, the intervening circumstance, favors the State. “The discovery of an
arrest warrant as an intervening circumstance ‘strongly favors the State.’” Cohagan, 162 Idaho at
722 (quoting Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062). Here, Mr. Pagan-Lopez does not dispute the valid arrest
warrant. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.14, Ls.3–14; Tr. Vol. I, p.11, Ls.18–19 (defense counsel conceding
valid warrant).) Therefore, this favor weighs in favor of attenuation.
Finally, the third factor, flagrancy and purpose of improper police action, favors
suppression. In Strieff, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an officer’s unlawful conduct in
stopping an individual who had exited a suspected drug house and walked to a nearby store to be
“an isolated instance of negligence that occurred in connection with a bona fide investigation of
a suspected drug house.” 136 S. Ct. at 2063. This conduct, though unconstitutional, did not favor
exclusion. Id. On the other hand, in Cohagan, this Court held that the officers’ conduct was
flagrant. 162 Idaho at 723–26. There, an officer stopped an individual, knowing he was not the
person the officers suspected, and ran a warrants check for “simply no reason.” Id. at 723–24. In
holding the officers’ conduct was a “suspicionless fishing expedition” and thus “untenable,” this
Court emphasized that such police conduct must be deterred. Id. at 724–26. This Court stated its
decision “should remove any lingering doubt as to whether this Court will sanction the
unjustified, suspicionless seizure of citizens. It is difficult to imagine how similar conduct,
4 The district court did not make a specific finding on the time of the search. Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s
counsel represented in his briefing that the search occurred at 6:06 a.m. (R., p.50.)
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following the release of this opinion, can be characterized as anything but purposeful or
flagrant.” Id. at 726. Here, the officers’ conduct falls closer to Cohagan than Strieff. The officers
engaged in an unjustified, suspicionless seizure of the vehicle and its occupants simply because
the vehicle was in the vicinity of a silent residential alarm. Tolerating this conduct would inform
law  enforcement  that  they  may  train  future  officers  to  conduct  traffic  stops  with  less  than
reasonable suspicion in the hopes that they discover an arrest warrant. See id. at 724–26
(discussing “implicit component” of exclusionary rule that its application influences officer
training). In other words, law enforcement would understand that “this Court will apply the apply
the attenuation doctrine to excuse a constitutional violation in the event that a fishing expedition
proves successful.” Id. at 725.
“In summary, although the discovery of the arrest warrant strongly favors attenuation, the
other two factors support a finding of suppression.” Id. at  726.  If  the  Court  considers  the
attenuation doctrine, it should “hold that the discovery of the evidence was not sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal stop as to break the causal chain between the unconstitutional stop
and the discovery of the evidence.” Id. Therefore, the district court erred by denying
Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s motion to suppress.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Rejecting Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s Guilty Plea
A. Introduction
Mr. Pagan-Lopez argues the district court abused its discretion by rejecting his knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance. The district court
rejected his plea because it would not allow Mr. Pagan-Lopez to waive an affirmative defense
and because it believed the existence of an affirmative defense negated Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s
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factual basis for the crime. An affirmative defense, however, can be waived by the defendant as
part of the entry of plea. Further, a factual basis is not required for a valid guilty plea, but, even if
it was, Mr. Pagan-Lopez provided one. Mr. Pagan-Lopez desired to accept the State’s plea offer,
waive a weak affirmative defense, and plead guilty. The district court abused its discretion by
refusing his plea and thus preventing him from accepting the State’s plea offer.
B. Standard Of Review
In  considering  a  claimed  abuse  of  discretion,  this  Court  applies  a  three-
factor test focusing upon: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue
as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its
discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it;  and (3) whether the trial  court  reached its  decision by an
exercise of reason.
Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 627 (2010).
C. The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards When
It Rejected Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s Knowing, Voluntary, and Intelligent Guilty Plea Due A
Potential, Yet Waived, Affirmative Defense
The district court’s decision whether to accept a guilty plea is discretionary. Schoger v.
State, 148 Idaho 622, 627, 630 (2009); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971) (“A court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.”).5 To properly
exercise its discretion and accept or reject a guilty plea, the district court must determine the plea
is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made by the criminal defendant. See, e.g., State v.
Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 297–98 (1990); State v. Williston, 159 Idaho 215, 218 (Ct. App. 2015).
In  addition,  the  district  court  must  comply  with  the  requirements  of  Idaho  Criminal  Rule
5 The district court has discretion to accept or reject a plea because a defendant “does not have an
absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court.” North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970). Similarly, the Idaho Criminal Rules do not require
the district court to accept a guilty plea. Schoger, 148 Idaho at 630.
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(“I.C.R.”) 11(c). Williston, 159 Idaho at 218. Rule 11(c) requires “the record and reasonable
inferences” to show:
(1) the voluntariness of the plea;
(2) that the defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including
minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences that may
apply;
(3) that the defendant was advised that, by pleading guilty, the defendant would
waive the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury,
and the right to confront witnesses against the defendant;
(4)  that  the  defendant  was  informed  of  the  nature  of  the  charge  against  the
defendant; and
(5) whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether the plea is
a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the nature of the agreement
and that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by any promises
or recommendation from either party as to punishment.
I.C.R. 11(c). “[T]he validity of a plea is to be determined by considering all the relevant
circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the record.” State v. Hawkins, 117 Idaho 285,
288 (1990).
Here, the district court abused its discretion by rejecting Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s guilty plea.
The facts, discussed below, show that Mr. Pagan-Lopez provided a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent guilty plea to the offense of possession of a controlled substance. The facts also show
that Mr. Pagan-Lopez wished to waive a potential affirmative defense and take advantage of the
State’s plea offer. The district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards
by refusing his guilty plea.
The district court began the plea colloquy by asking Mr. Pagan-Lopez, under oath, if he
was  mentally  and  physically  fit  to  proceed  with  his  guilty  plea  decision,  if  he  was  coerced  or
pressured to enter the plea, and if he wanted to enter the plea agreement and plead guilty.
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(Tr. Vol. I, p.33, Ls.3–25.) All of his responses demonstrated his plea was knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently made. (Tr. Vol. I, p.33, Ls.3–25.) Next, the district court read the
charged offense of possession of a controlled substance and asked Mr. Pagan-Lopez, “How do
you think you committed this offense?” (Tr. Vol. I, p.34, Ls.4–9.) He answered: “I pick it up on
the street and put it on my socks and forget about it. I got arrested, and I end up over there with
the substance.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.34, Ls.10–12.) The district court clarified that by “I pick it up”
Mr. Pagan-Lopez meant “methamphetamine” and that he knew it was a controlled substance,
though he did not know “exactly” what it was. (Tr. Vol. I, p.34, Ls.13–20.) The district court
then asked if Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s intention was “to possess that, to keep it.” Mr. Pagan-Lopez
answered, “My intention was to throw it away, but I didn’t find the right place to throw it away.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.34, Ls.23–24.) The district court asked Mr. Pagan-Lopez “how long did you
possess it?” (Tr. Vol. I, p.34, L.25–p.35, L.1.) He responded, “Your Honor, I put it on my socks,
and I forgot about it. I don’t remember how long -- several hours.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.35, Ls.2–3.) The
district  court  then  asked,  “Do  you  believe  you  had  any  lawful  reason  to  have  it?”  (Tr.  Vol.  I,
p.35, Ls.4–5.) Mr. Pagan-Lopez answered, “I did no time [sic], no reason to have it, other than I
found it, and there was a lot of kids around the area that I found it, and I just grab it and throw it
away later in the right place, and I forgot about it.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.35, Ls.6–9.)
Based on these statements, the district court rejected Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s guilty plea. The
district court stated, “I don’t believe that that’s a provident plea. He’s asserting a defense that he
had a lawful reason to possess it, to dispose of it. Given those explanations, I don’t think that
he’s admitted every element of the offense, so I don’t think that’s a provident plea.” (Tr. Vol. I,
p.35, Ls.10–15.) After some comments by the State on the elements of the offense,  the district
court stated:
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Here’s my concern related to the instructions. In the standard instruction
421, a person has possession of something if the person knows it’s present and
has physical control of it, so while I do agree he’s admitted that he possessed
controlled substance, possession can include holding an item. My concern is that
his statements give rise to a necessity defense, which is defined in Idaho Code
Standard Instruction 512, where a defendant cannot be guilty of a named crime if
the defendant acted because of necessity and what he’s saying is he picked it up
because he knew it was methamphetamine[,] there were children around[,] and he
was going to dispose of it to protect those children.
Conduct which violates the law is justified by necessity if there is a
specific threat of immediate harm to the defendant or another person. The
defendant  did  not  bring  about  the  circumstances  which  created  the  threat  of  the
immediate harm. He’s not saying it was his methamphetamine. He said, you
know, he came upon it and was picking it up to protect small children, that the
defendant could not have prevented the threatened harm by a less offensive
alternative. I think there is an issue, but, again, that would be an issue for the jury
to determine beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the harm caused by violating the
law was less than the threatened harm.
So my concern is that, given his statements, there may be a defense to this
particular offense, and he has not admitted that he planned to continue to possess
it, and I do understand that possession in the interim could be a lawful violation,
but, as stated, I’m not going to twist his arm to enter a guilty plea if he thinks that
he was protecting small children by his behavior, and so I’m not willing to accept
a plea on the eve of trial,6 given his statements to the court under oath.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.36, L.12–p.37, L.22 (emphasis added).) The district court then confirmed with
Mr. Pagan-Lopez that he “got nervous” with the police officers and “completely forgot” about
the methamphetamine until the jail search. (Tr. Vol. I, p.38, L.15–p.39, L.6.) After this
discussion, Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s trial counsel informed the district court:
Your Honor, I would say that I have discussed with my client this issue in that his
potential defense of necessity at trial and whether he would like to go to trial with
a necessity with possibly posing the necessity defense, or take a plea deal in this
case, and he has indicated to me that he would like to take the plea deal if the
court is willing to accept it and forgo trial. That’s my understanding of my
client’s wishes at this point in time.
6 This hearing was held on March 23, 2017, and trial was set for eleven days later on April 3,
2017. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, Ls.10–12.)
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(Tr. Vol. I, p.39, Ls.9–17 (emphasis added).) Trial counsel also recognized that, in another case,
the defendant prevailed in a post-conviction appeal for trial counsel’s failure to request a jury
instruction on the necessity defense,7 but emphasized,
I  think  my facts  are  a  lot  hard[er]  to  get  to,  given  the  time of  the  morning,  my
client’s just now statement under oath that proving that there were children
present, essentially, in the middle of the night, would be very hard burden, and my
client would like to preserve the plea offer in this case.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.39, L.18–p.40, L.4.) After trial counsel’s response, the district court asked
Mr. Pagan-Lopez:
Q. Mr.  Pagan-Lopez,  look,  I  don’t  want  to  twist  your  arm  to  enter  a  guilty
plea. This case is set for trial. We will try the case. If you want to present
the evidence that you’ve told me here today to a jury, they certainly have
the  ability  to  weigh  and  determine  that,  so  I  don’t  want  you  to  feel  like
you’re being pressured into entering a plea. Do you want to enter a guilty
plea today?
A. I do.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.40, Ls.6–14 (emphasis added).) But, instead of accepting Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s guilty
plea, the district court informed the parties that it would accept an Alford plea, “if the parties are
willing to do that.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.40, Ls.15–26.) The State was not “willing to . . . offer” an
Alford plea. (Tr. Vol. I, p.40, L.29–p.41, L.7.) “So, with that,” the district court said,
I  don’t  find  his  statements  to  be  provident  as  it  goes  to  a  plea,  that  there  is  a
defense that’s available. I recognize that under North Carolina [v.] Alford, people
may elect to take a plea rather than go to trial in evaluating potential outcomes,
but, given the fact that he’s not willing to admit that it was not lawful possession,
I am not willing to take his plea at this point.
7 This post-conviction appeal, Payne v. State, 159 Idaho 879 (Ct. App. 2016), had the same
district court judge as the instant case. In Payne, the district court summarily dismissed the
defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief, which raised, among other claims, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim for failing to raise the defense of misfortune or accident and request
that jury instruction. Id. at 880. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held the dismissal of this
claim was in error. Id. at 884–85.
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(Tr. Vol. I, p.41, Ls.8–15.) After some discussion of trial issues, Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s counsel
reiterated his client’s desire to enter a guilty plea. He stated,
Just as much as it is work, since my client did make the statement that he would
like the court to accept his plea in this case, I would just note that my client did
provide a factual basis for the plea. He does have a possible defense of necessity.
My client has expressed to me that he would like the plea agreement in lieu of
going to trial. In exchange for his plea agreement, he is getting a count
[(introduction of major contraband)] dismissed.
My client has a right to plead guilty. I don’t think there’s necessarily a
factual element not met by his recitation. There is a defense that he could
potentially use at trial and present to the jury and we understand that, but it’s still
my understanding that he wanted to take advantage of the plea offer in this case
and that he did admit to knowingly possessing methamphetamine.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.46, Ls.1–16 (emphasis added).) The district court responded, “I know. It’s the issue
related to the unlawfulness, and, quite frankly, the deals on the eve of trial, I spend all of my time
doing them in postconviction, so we might as well just go to trial in the first place.” (Tr. Vol. I,
p.46, Ls.17–21.) The district court concluded that, “if he has any different reflections about the
lawfulness of that possession,” “you can set it on the court’s calendar.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.46, Ls.23–
25.)
These facts unequivocally show that Mr. Pagan-Lopez desired to enter a guilty plea.
These facts also show that the district court misapplied the relevant legal standards in two related
ways. First, it would not let Mr. Pagan-Lopez voluntarily and knowingly waive an affirmative
defense and accept the State’s offer. Second, it believed the existence of a potential affirmative
defense  negated  Mr.  Pagan-Lopez’s  admission  to  the  commission  of  the  crime  and,  without  a
clear factual basis, it could not accept the plea. Both rulings were inconsistent with the legal
standards.
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1. A Valid Guilty Plea Waives An Affirmative Defense
The district court did not act consistently with the applicable standards when it prohibited
Mr. Pagan-Lopez from waiving an affirmative defense. It is well established that “a valid guilty
plea, waives all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or statutory.”
State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 546 (1983); see  also  State  v.  Fowler, 105 Idaho 642, 643
(Ct. App. 1983). Here, Mr. Pagan-Lopez identified the potential affirmative defense of necessity
and clearly desired to waive it. There was no indication that his guilty plea and accompanying
waiver were coerced or otherwise involuntary. Even after the district court expressed its
concerns, Mr. Pagan-Lopez repeated his intention to plead guilty. (Tr. Vol. I, p.40, Ls.6–14.) He
also informed the district court that he believed the defense was weak and would be very hard to
prove at trial.8 (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, L.18–p.40, L.4.) At trial, Mr. Pagan-Lopez would have the
burden of production for the defense. State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 666 (Ct. App. 2000)
(defense has the burden of production for a necessity defense). If he failed to make a prima facie
showing of the elements of the defense, he would not have the right to present his defense to the
jury. State v. Chisholm, 126 Idaho 319, 321 (Ct. App. 1994) (no right to present affirmative
defense at  trial  without prima facie showing of elements); see also State v.  Howley, 128 Idaho
874, 878–79 (1996) (no error in exclusion of necessity defense). Since this defense was
Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s burden to produce, he can freely waive it through a valid guilty plea. It is an
abuse of discretion for the district court to force a defendant to go to trial, despite a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent plea, because the district court believes the defendant has a potential,
yet knowingly waived, affirmative defense to the charge. The district court did not act
8 Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s prediction proved correct. The jury convicted him, despite the presentation
of a necessity defense. (See R., p.99 (necessity defense jury instruction).)
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consistently with the legal standards by refusing to accept a guilty plea because “there may be a
defense.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.37, L.14.)
2. A Valid Guilty Plea Does Not Require A Factual Basis
Second, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards when
it reasoned that it could not accept the plea because the element of “unlawful possession” was
not satisfied by Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s admission of guilt. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.35, Ls.10–15, p.41,
Ls.8–15.) “There is no requirement that the trial court must establish a factual basis for the
crimes charged prior to accepting a guilty plea.” Hawkins, 117 Idaho at 290 (citing Coffin, 104
Idaho at 545). This principle is also well established. See, e.g., State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484
(1993); State  v.  West, 100 Idaho 16, 17 (1976); Williston, 159 Idaho at 217. “[A] valid guilty
plea, voluntarily and understandingly given, is a judicial admission of all facts charged by the
indictment or information.” Hawkins, 117 Idaho at 290 (citing State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670, 673
(1978)). Therefore, Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s valid guilty plea was all that was required for the district
court to accept it. The district court did not need a factual basis. Nor did it need to inquire and
rule out potential defenses. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 36 n.5 (1976) (“I[t] is unnecessary,
however, for the trial court to enumerate each defense which is or is not waived. For the sake of
expediency, it is sufficient if the trial court informs the accused that by pleading guilty he waives
any defenses he may have to the offense charged.”). The district court did not act consistently
with the legal standards by rejecting Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s guilty plea because it believed he did
not admit “every element of the offense.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.35, Ls.10–15.)
That being said, Mr. Pagan-Lopez actually provided the district court with a factual basis
for his guilty plea. Mr. Pagan-Lopez said, under oath, he knowingly possessed a controlled
substance. (Tr. Vol. I, p.34, L.4–p.35, L.9.) Although he said he forgot about the
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methamphetamine in his sock, those statements go to the necessity defense, not the elements of
the crime itself. “The necessity defense is based on the premise that ‘a person who is compelled
to commit an illegal act in order to prevent a greater harm should not be punished for that act.’”
State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 414 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854,
855 (1990)). While the crime is justifiable due to a necessity, the person still committed the
illegal act. So, even if Mr. Pagan-Lopez was justified in his methamphetamine possession, he
knowingly possessed it nonetheless and committed the crime. The district court did not act
consistently with the legal standards by ruling a potential necessity defense negated the elements
of the offense.
Along the same lines, the district court abused its discretion by requiring “unlawful
possession.” (See Tr. Vol. I, p.41, Ls.8–15.) “Unlawful” possession is not an element of the
offense.  The  elements  of  possession  of  a  controlled  substance  are  possession  and  knowledge.
State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 7–8 (2014); State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999).
Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s plea colloquy satisfied those elements. Whether his possession was “lawful,”
i.e., justifiable or excusable by some defense, does not bear on his admission to the crime. The
district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards by holding that
Mr. Pagan-Lopez did not establish a factual basis for his guilty plea.
3. The District Court’s Rejection Of Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s Guilty Plea Prejudiced Him
Finally, the State cannot prove this error was harmless. As part of the plea agreement, the
State  agreed  to  dismiss  the  charge  of  introduction  of  major  contraband  and  to  recommend
probation, with an underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.27,
Ls.6–16.) Because the district court rejected his plea, Mr. Pagan-Lopez did not receive the
benefit  of  the  State’s  offer.  The  jury  found  Mr.  Pagan-Lopez  guilty  of  both  offenses,  and
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Mr. Pagan-Lopez now has two felony convictions instead of one. (Tr. Vol. I, p.277, Ls.6–25;
R., p.105.) At sentencing, the State did not recommend probation. (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, Ls.3–8.) The
district court sentenced Mr. Pagan-Lopez to less fixed time than the State would have
recommended  as  part  of  the  plea  agreement  (one  fixed  year  instead  of  two),  but  imposed  the
same indeterminate time of five years. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.3–10; R., pp.109–12.)
Mr. Pagan-Lopez also received a concurrent sentence of two and one-half indeterminate years
for introduction of major contraband. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.3–10; R., pp.109–12.) The district
court did not place Mr. Pagan-Lopez on probation, but rather retained jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.15, Ls.1–5.) Hence, Mr. Pagan-Lopez was in custody throughout the criminal proceedings plus
another seven months for the period of retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.109–112 (judgment of
conviction with 189 days of credit); Aug. R., pp.1–3 (judgment after retained jurisdiction).)
Although he was eventually placed on probation, (Aug. R., pp.1–3), Mr. Pagan-Lopez was
incarcerated far longer than if he had been allowed to plead guilty and proceed to sentencing,
where he may have received a suspended sentence and probation upon the State’s
recommendation. Therefore, the State cannot the district court’s improper rejection of
Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s guilty plea was harmless.
III.
Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s Convictions And Punishments For Possession Of A Controlled Substance
And Introduction Of Major Contraband Into The Jail Violated His Right To Be Free From
Double Jeopardy
A. Introduction
Mr. Pagan-Lopez argues his right to be free from double jeopardy pursuant to the Idaho
Constitution was violated because he was convicted and punished for both a greater and lesser
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included offense. Under the pleading theory, the charged offense of possession of a controlled
substance was a lesser included offense of introduction of major contraband. The duplicative
convictions and punishments for the greater and lesser included offense resulted in a clear
violation of Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s unwaived constitutional right, and this constitutional error was
not harmless.
B. Standard Of Review
As  a  question  of  law,  this  Court  exercises  free  review  over  whether  a  defendant’s
“prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against being placed in jeopardy twice.”
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63 (Ct. App. 2000).
C. Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s Unwaived Constitutional Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy
Was Clearly Violated Because Two Convictions And Punishments Were Imposed For A
Greater And Lesser Included Offense
Mr. Pagan-Lopez did not raise this double jeopardy claim below, and therefore he raises
it for the first time on appeal as a fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 225 (2010).
The  fundamental  error  doctrine  places  the  burden  on  the  defendant  to  show  the  alleged  error:
“(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists
(without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.” Id. at 228. Here, Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s alleged error meets this test. First, the error
violated his unwaived right under the Idaho Constitution to be free from double jeopardy.
Second, the error is clear the record and not the product of a strategic or tactical decision. Third,
the error was not harmless because the error affected Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s substantial rights and
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the outcome of the proceedings. Each prong of the fundamental error test will be addressed
below.
1. Possession Of A Controlled Substance Was A Lesser Included Offense Of
Introduction Of Major Contraband Into The Jail, And Thus Multiple Punishments
For This Offense Violated Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s Unwaived Double Jeopardy Rights
“The double jeopardy clause of the Idaho Constitution states:  ‘No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.’” State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, 87 (2016) (quoting
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13). “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho and United States
Constitutions affords a defendant three basic protections. It protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,
and multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.” State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370
(Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994); State v. McKeeth, 136
Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001)). The third type of protection—against multiple punishments for
the same offense—is at issue here. Under Idaho’s double jeopardy clause, “a defendant may not
be convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense.” Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 87 (quoting
State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841 (2013)). Punishment for both the lesser and greater
included offense violates the Idaho Constitution. State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 (Ct. App.
2014) (citing State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 434–35 (1980)).
Under the Idaho Constitution, the appellate courts use the pleading theory “to determine
whether one offense is a lesser-included offense of the other.” Id. at 658 (citing Thompson, 101
Idaho at 434–35). “This theory holds ‘that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in the
information  [or  indictment]  as  a  means  or  element  of  the  commission  of  the  higher  offense.’”
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Sivak v. State, 112
Idaho 197, 211 (1986)). “Under this pleading theory, a court must consider whether the terms of
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the charging document allege that both offenses arose from the same factual circumstances such
that  one  offense  was  the  means  by  which  the  other  was  committed.” Moad, 156 Idaho at 658
(citing Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841; State v. McCormick, 100
Idaho 111, 115 (1979); State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 301 (1960)). “An ‘included offense’ is
one which is necessarily committed in the commission of another offense; or one, the essential
elements of which are charged in the information as the manner or means by which the offense
was committed.” Thompson, 101 Idaho at 434 (quoting State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69 (1963)).
Here, Mr. Pagan-Lopez was charged with two offenses arising from the same factual
circumstances. The Information charged:
COUNT I
That the defendant, CARLOS ENRIQUE PAGAN-LOPEZ, on or about the 2nd
day of December, 2016, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did unlawfully
possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II
controlled substance.
COUNT II
That the defendant, CARLOS ENRIQUE PAGAN-LOPEZ, on or about the 2nd
day of December, 2016, did knowingly and unlawfully introduce and/or attempt
to introduce major contraband to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled
substance into a correctional facility or the grounds of a correctional facility
without permission of the facility head.
(R.,  p.32.)  Examining  these  two  charges,  Mr.  Pagan-Lopez’s  possession  of  a  controlled
substance was the means or manner by which he committed the offense of introduction of major
contraband into a correctional facility. The Information alleges that “both offenses arose from the
same factual circumstances such that [possession of a controlled substance] was the means by
which [introduction of major contraband into a correctional facility] was committed.” Moad, 156
Idaho at 658. Both offenses are entirely based on the same factual predicate of law enforcement
finding the baggie of methamphetamine in Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s sock at the jail on December 2.
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“The language used in both counts lays out the same factual circumstances as the basis for each
offense.” Corbus, 151 Idaho at 375. Mr. Pagan-Lopez introduced methamphetamine into the jail
by possessing that same methamphetamine. He could not have committed the offense of
introduction of methamphetamine into the jail without also committing the offense of possession
of methamphetamine. Put another way, his possession of the methamphetamine was necessary
for  him  to  introduce  it  into  the  jail.  Therefore,  under  the  pleading  theory,  possession  of  a
controlled substance was a lesser included offense of introduction of major contraband into a
correctional facility.
Mr. Pagan-Lopez was prosecuted, convicted, and punished for both the lesser and greater
offense. This was violation of his unwaived right under the Idaho Constitution to be free from
double jeopardy. See Moad, 156 Idaho at 658. As such, Mr. Pagan-Lopez has met his burden
under the first prong of the fundamental error test.
2. The Error Is Clear And Obvious From The Record
Mr.  Pagan-Lopez  further  submits  the  second  prong  of  the  fundamental  error  test  is
satisfied. To review a double jeopardy violation under the pleading theory, the appellate courts
examine the charging document:  “[W]hether one crime is a lesser included offense of another
crime can be determined from the face of the record simply by reading the information charging
each crime.” Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 87 (quoting McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841). As such, there is
no need for information outside of the record. Further, there is no tactical or strategic reason for
trial counsel to fail to object to a clear violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. The right
to be protected from double jeopardy is so fundamental that is expressed in the Idaho
Constitution, and I.C. § 19-2312 codifies the pleading theory. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433–
34 (discussing I.C. § 19-2312); Anderson, 82 Idaho at 300–03 (same). Mr. Pagan-Lopez gained
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no tactical or strategic advantage by being convicted and punished for the greater and lesser
included offense. Additionally, there is no indication that trial counsel waived the double
jeopardy violation. Thus, Mr. Pagan-Lopez asserts the error plainly exists.
3. The Error Is Not Harmless
Finally, Mr. Pagan-Lopez contends the third prong of the fundamental error test is met.
Under Perry, the defendant must show the error is not harmless, that is, “there is a reasonable
possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” 150 Idaho at 226. Here, the double
jeopardy violation affected the outcome because Mr. Pagan-Lopez was convicted, and
subsequently sentenced, for two offenses instead of one. (Tr. Vol. I, p.277, Ls.6–25 (verdict);
R., p.105 (verdict), pp.109–12 (judgment of conviction).) He would have one less felony
conviction without the error. He would have a lesser punishment as well. The lesser included
offense of possession of a controlled substance contains the harsher sentence of five years, with
one year fixed. (R., pp.109–10.) Therefore, Mr. Pagan-Lopez has shown the error harmed him
and affected his substantial rights to be free from double jeopardy. He respectfully requests this
Court vacate his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion At Trial By Excluding Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s Layperson
Testimony Of His Mental Health
A. Introduction
Mr. Pagan-Lopez asserts the district court abused its discretion when it excluded his
testimony about his mental condition. Specifically, he contends the district court did not act
consistently with the legal standards under I.C. § 18-207. This statute requires notice of evidence
from an expert witness on mental condition. It does not restrict a layperson’s testimony on
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mental condition. By ruling this statute barred Mr. Pagan-Lopez from testifying about his own
mental health condition, the district court abused its discretion.
B. Standard Of Review
When reviewing the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an
abuse of discretion standard. To determine whether a trial court has abused its
discretion, this Court considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as
discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by
an exercise of reason.
State v. Anderson, 162 Idaho 610, 614–15 (2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015).
C. The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards When
It Required Mr. Pagan-Lopez To Give The State Notice Of His Layperson Testimony On
His Mental Health Condition
Idaho Code  §  18-207 states,  “Mental  condition  shall  not  be  a  defense  to  any  charge  of
criminal conduct.” I.C. § 18-207(1). This rule, however, is not “intended to prevent the
admission  of  expert  evidence  on  the  issue  of  any  state  of  mind  which  is  an  element  of  the
offense, subject to the rules of evidence.” I.C. § 18-207(3). “That is, a defendant may present
evidence of a mental disease or defect to negate the intent or other mens rea element  of  the
charged crime.” State v. Santistevan, 143 Idaho 527, 529–30 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v.
Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 635–36 (1990); State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 621 (1985); State v.
Patterson, 126 Idaho 227, 229 (Ct. App. 1994)).
The issue in this case pertains to the interpretation of I.C. § 18-207’s strict notice
requirements. It states in part:
(4)  No court  shall,  over  the  objection  of  any  party,  receive  the  evidence  of  any
expert  witness  on  any  issue  of  mental  condition,  or  permit  such  evidence  to  be
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placed before a jury, unless such evidence is fully subject to the adversarial
process in at least the following particulars:
(a)  Notice  must  be  given  at  least  ninety  (90)  days  in  advance  of  trial,  or
such other period as justice may require, that a party intends to raise any issue of
mental condition and to call expert witnesses concerning such issue, failing which
such witness shall not be permitted to testify until such time as the opposing party
has a complete opportunity to consider the substance of such testimony and
prepare for rebuttal through such opposing expert(s) as the party may choose.
(b) A party who expects to call an expert witness to testify on an issue of
mental condition must, on a schedule to be set by the court, furnish to the
opposing  party  a  written  synopsis  of  the  findings  of  such  expert,  or  a  copy of  a
written report. The court may authorize the taking of depositions to inquire further
into the substance of such reports or synopses.
I.C. § 18-207(4)(a)–(b). “The admission of expert testimony is conditioned upon proper notice so
as to allow the opposing party a complete opportunity to consider the substance of such
testimony and prepare for rebuttal.” State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing
I.C. § 18-207(4)(a)).
Here, the district court interpreted these notice requirements to bar Mr. Pagan-Lopez
from testifying about his own mental condition. The district court reasoned,
Nothing in 18-207 prevents admission of expert evidence on the issue of state of
mind, which is an element of an offense, but it’s subject to the rules of evidence.
18-207(4) prevents the court, because the statute says “shall.” “No court shall
over the objection of any party receive the evidence of any expert witness on any
issue of mental condition or permit such evidence to be placed before a jury
unless  such  evidence  was  fully  subject  to  the  adversarial  process  in  at  least  the
following particulars.” It requires 90 days of notice in advance of trial under (A).
(B),  if  it’s  an  expert  witness  requires  a  written  report,  waives  any  medical
privilege and then provides the provisions for appointment of such expert if the
defendant is indigent. So to that extent, I do not find that the rules related to
presentation of evidence on a physical or mental impairment under 18-207 have
been meant, so since there was no notice, I will not permit inquiry on those issues.
. . . .
18-207 addresses, not only expert testimony, and, (4), presents it through
evidence of an expert witness or permit such evidence to be placed before a jury,
so it's not just limited to an expert. It’s also limited to the defendant’s own
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opinion of his medical condition, so I do believe the rule prohibits it without
proper notice.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.200, L.11–p.201, L.4, p.201, 14–20.) This interpretation was in error. The notice
requirements in I.C. § 18-207 govern evidence from an expert witness.  They  do  not  control
testimony from a layperson. “Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language.
This  Court  considers  the  statute  as  a  whole,  and  gives  words  their  plain,  usual,  and  ordinary
meanings.” Owens, 158 Idaho at 3. The pertinent language in this case states:  “No court shall,
over the objection of any party, receive the evidence of any expert witness on any issue of mental
condition, or permit such evidence to be placed before a jury, unless such evidence is fully
subject to the adversarial process in at least the following particulars . . . .” I.C. § 18-207(4)
(emphasis added). Looking at the plain meaning, these notice requirements apply to “the
evidence of any expert witness.” It is clear that the two later references to “such evidence” refer
back  to  the  first  reference  of  “the  evidence  of  any  expert  witness.”  The  district  court  erred  by
interpreting the second two references to “such evidence” as referring to any and all evidence of
mental condition, by an expert or a layperson. The plain language of I.C. § 18-207(4) does not
impose any notice requirement on layperson testimony of mental condition. This interpretation is
further supported by the statute as a whole. Each subsection of the notice requirements in
I.C § 18-207(4) refers to an expert or examiner. I.C. § 18-207(4)(a)–(e). There is no reference of
layperson testimony or other layperson evidence. Only the evidence of an expert witness on
mental condition is subject to the statute’s notice requirements.
Due to the district court’s erroneous interpretation of the statute, the district court failed
to apply the correct legal standards when it excluded Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s testimony about his
mental health condition. Mr. Pagan-Lopez intended to testify in his defense that he suffered from
“memory problems” and “epilepsy.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.198, Ls.20–23.) His trial counsel explained,
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Your Honor, I believe that the defenses we have proposed, one being necessity
and one being mistake or misfortune or accident of possessing the
methamphetamine, that it will come to light as to why my client did not report the
methamphetamine to law enforcement and still had it on his person and then did
not  report  it  to  Officer  Feldner  and  then  did  not  report  it  to  Officer  Ellis  or  to
Deputy Keber. It would be relevant to explain why he did not do that.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.199, Ls.6–14.) The district court did not address relevancy, but instead excluded the
evidence due to Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s failure to give notice to the State. (Tr. Vol. I, p.200, L.11-
p.201, L.4, p.201, Ls.14–20.) This was in error because Mr. Pagan-Lopez, a layperson, did not
have  to  give  the  State  notice  of  his  own  testimony  of  his  mental  condition.  The  district  court
should have allowed Mr. Pagan-Lopez to provide this testimony. See Idaho Rule of Evidence
(“I.R.E.”) 701 (allowing layperson opinion testimony if certain factors are met); Cf. Dodge-
Farrar v. Am. Cleaning Servs. Co., 137 Idaho 838, 841–43 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding a layperson
may testify to cause of medical condition if it is “within the usual and ordinary experience of the
average person”). Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion because it failed to act
consistently with the applicable legal standards, and the State cannot prove that this error was
harmless.
V.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Pagan-Lopez To Pay Restitution For
The State’s Prosecution Costs
A. Introduction
Mr. Pagan-Lopez argues the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
$996.27  in  restitution  to  the  State  for  its  cost  to  prosecute  him.  He  contends  the  district  court
abused  its  discretion  because  the  State  failed  to  show with  substantial  and  competent  evidence
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the costs actually incurred for prosecution. Due to the lack of evidence, this Court should vacate
the district court’s restitution order.
B. Standard Of Review
To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court
evaluates whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently
with  relevant  legal  standards;  and  (3)  reached  its  decision  by  an  exercise  of
reason.
State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919 (2017). “What amount of restitution to award is a question
of fact for the district court, ‘whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial
evidence.’” State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 700 (2017) (quoting State v. Weaver, 158
Idaho 167, 170 (Ct. App. 2014)).
C. The  District  Court  Did  Not  Act  Consistently  With  The  Applicable  Legal  Standards
Because The Evidence Was Insufficient To Prove The State’s Costs Actually Incurred To
Prosecute Mr. Pagan-Lopez
Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) “permits the State to recoup its prosecution costs as restitution.”
State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 695 (2017); Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700. It reads in relevant
part:
Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this chapter .
. . , the court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies
in investigating the violation. Law enforcement agencies shall include, but not be
limited to, the Idaho state police, county and city law enforcement agencies, the
office of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney offices.
Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the purchase of
evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and witnesses
throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and trials, and any other
investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular
salaries of employees. . . . A conviction for the purposes of this section means that
the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of
the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s).
I.C. § 37-2732(k) (emphasis added). Restitution under this statute is discretionary. Nelson, 161
Idaho at 695; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700. The district court may, in its discretion, order
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restitution to county prosecuting attorney offices for “prosecution expenses actually incurred,
including regular salaries of employees.” I.C. § 37-2732(k). “As guidance concerning the correct
interpretation of section 37-2732(k),” the Court noted “that section 37-2732(k), by its plain
terms, grants discretion to award restitution to the State for prosecution expenses ‘actually
incurred.’” Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702. “At a minimum,
measuring up to section 37-2732(k)’s burden to prove expenses actually incurred will generally
require sworn statements that delineate the time spent performing specific tasks.” Nelson, 161
Idaho at 697; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702. The restitution award must be supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Nelson, 161 Idaho at 695; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700.
In two recent companion cases, Nelson and Cunningham, this Court clarified the
evidentiary standards for the State’s restitution request under this statute. In both Nelson and
Cunningham,  the  State  offered  a  one-paragraph  form  titled  “Statement  of  Costs.” Nelson, 161
Idaho at 695; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700. The Court found this form “problematic for several
reasons.” Nelson, 161 Idaho at 695; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700. It was a “boilerplate, fill-in-
the-blank-style form” used by the State in other cases. Nelson, 161 Idaho at 695; Cunningham,
161 Idaho at 700. The form “merely” identified the defendant, case number, and prosecutor.
Nelson, 161 Idaho at 695; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700. The form also stated the total number
of attorney hours, the hourly rate, and sum total of the request, but did not “contain itemized time
entries explaining the tasks performed or the expenditures made in the particular case.” Nelson,
161 Idaho at 695–96; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700. In Nelson in particular,  the form did not
confirm that the State sought restitution for expenses actually incurred in the prosecution
resulting in the defendant’s conviction, and not the costs from a previous mistrial, acquittal of
one charge, or prosecution of a co-defendant. 161 Idaho at 696. Finally, in both cases, neither
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form was certified as correct. Id.; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700. Both consisted of unsworn
statements with the prosecutor’s signature. Nelson, 161 Idaho at 696; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at
700-01. Due to these deficiencies, the Court concluded the “Statement of Costs” forms were not
substantial evidence upon which to base restitution for prosecution costs. Nelson, 161 Idaho at
697; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 701-02.
Just like the forms in Nelson and Cunningham, the form here also fails to satisfy the
substantial evidence standard to award restitution for prosecution costs. The “Certificate of
Records” states:
1. I am employed by the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney and as such have
access to payroll records maintained by Ada County in the regular course of its
business.
2. I am aware that the Ada County Prosecutor’s Office keeps records regarding
the attorney time spent prosecuting drug cases in anticipation of submitting a
request for restitution pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k).
3. I have reviewed the time log in this case, which documents the prosecutor time
spent prosecuting the above referenced drug case. Jill Longhurst spent .3 hours
working on this case,  Heather Reilly spent .1 hours working on this case,  James
Vogt spent 1.3 hours working on this case, Kai Wittwer spent .1 hours working on
this case, and Tanner Stellmon spent 16.5 hours working on this case. I’ve applied
the appropriate payroll rate for said attorneys and calculated the aggregate actual
prosecution cost to be a total of $996.27.
4. Pursuant to Idaho Code §37-2732(k), the State requests restitution in the
amount of $996.27.
5. The foregoing is true and correct to the best of my information and belief.
(R., pp.116–17.) The form was sworn and signed by this employee. (R., pp.116–17.) This form is
“problematic for several reasons.” Nelson, 161 Idaho at 695; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700.
First, similar to Nelson and Cunningham, the form “merely” identifies Mr. Pagan-Lopez, the
case number, and prosecutors. Nelson, 161 Idaho at 695; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700. There
is no further description of the case, except that it qualifies for restitution as a “drug case.”
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(R., p.116.) Second, the employee avers she reviewed the time log, but there is no evidence
pertaining to the verification or confirmation of that time from the prosecutors. The form
indicates that this employee simply collected and input any time spent by any prosecutor that
was attached to this case name or number. Third, and again similar to Nelson and Cunningham,
the form does not “contain itemized time entries explaining the tasks performed or the
expenditures made in the particular case.” Nelson, 161 Idaho at 695–96; Cunningham, 161 Idaho
at 700. Instead, the form refers to five different prosecutors “working on the case” without any
additional explanation of the tasks performed or the date of the task. (R., pp.116–17.) Fourth,
although the form is sworn and signed, it was done so, presumably, by an office administration
or human resources employee, but certainly not any of the prosecutors. Finally, the employee
said she applied the “applicable payroll rate” for five different prosecutors, but these unknown,
undisclosed payroll rates may not be consistent with the “regular salaries” of each prosecutor, as
required by the statute. I.C. § 37-2732(k). In fact, according to this form, the average payroll rate
for the prosecutors is $54.44 per hour.9 This is a salary of $113,235.20 per year.10 The statute,
however, “does not permit the recovery of what is ‘reasonable’” for attorney fees. Nelson, 161
Idaho at 397; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702. The State can only recover “expenses actually
incurred.” Nelson, 161 Idaho at 397; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702. Based on these
deficiencies, the “Certificate of Record” does not prove the State’s prosecution costs with
substantial and competent evidence. As required in Nelson and Cunningham, “measuring up to
section 37-2732(k)’s burden to prove expenses actually incurred” requires “at a minimum”
“sworn statements that delineate the time spent performing specific tasks.” Nelson, 161 Idaho at
397; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702. The “Certificate of Record” falls short of this standard.
9 $996.27 ÷ 18.3 hours (.3+.1+1.3+.1+16.5) = $54.44.
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Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by ordering Mr. Pagan-Lopez to pay
restitution  to  the  State  for  its  cost  to  prosecute  him.  The  district  court  did  not  act  consistently
with the applicable legal standards because it did misapplied I.C. § 37-2732(k) and recent case
law on the evidentiary standards for restitution. Properly applied, the State’s “Certificate of
Records” does not constitute substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a restitution
award. As such, Mr. Pagan-Lopez respectfully requests this Court vacate the restitution award
“for lack of evidence” and remand this case for further proceedings. Cunningham, 161 Idaho at
702.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Pagan-Lopez respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s
order denying his motion to suppress, his judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings on the suppression motion. Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court
vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this case with instructions to the district court to
accept his guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance pursuant to the State’s prior plea
offer. In the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction as
to  possession  of  a  controlled  substance  due  the  double  jeopardy  violation.  Alternatively,  he
respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction in its entirety due to the
district court’s erroneous evidentiary ruling at trial. Finally, he respectfully requests this Court
vacate the district court’s restitution order and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of February, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
10 $54.44 x 2,080 hours (52 weeks/year x 40 hours) = $113,235.20.
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